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History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to
endure. The World War B relocation-camp cases, and the Red
scare and McCarthy-era internal subversion cases, are only the
most extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms
to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we
invariably come to regret it.
L Introduction
The tragedy of 9/11 left the United States reeling, frightened by a
threat to domestic security that resulted in the single most damaging terrorist
attack the world has ever seen. In response to the attacks, the United States
vowed to secure itself from an enemy unlike anyone has faced before. The
resulting war on terror is a multi-faceted effort, fought on multiple fronts.
Financially, the federal government has targeted terrorist organizations by
freezing bank accounts, limiting their funds and resources. Internationally,
the government has entered into a war in Iraq to rid the world of a despot it
perceives as a threat to national security. Domestically, the United States has
tried to consolidate its intelligence communities and passed sweeping
legislation, such as the Patriot Act, to ensure that these communities have the
necessary resources to combat terrorists effectively. Though there has not
been another attack of the same magnitude domestically, many criticize the
government's approach as too invasive, too unilateral, and just plain
ineffective.
Given the nature of the 9/11 attacks, the government has focused on
aviation security to ensure that a similar attack will not happen again. As
part of the focus on aviation security, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has begun to use government watch lists to screen
potential terrorists and terrorist suspects and prevent them from boarding
aircrafts. The use of these watch lists has been highly scrutinized by the
public and Congress for lack of adequate redress procedures for passengers
I Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
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who are flagged as false positives. When TSA attempted to develop
improved and more comprehensive pre-screening procedures, Congress
stopped further progress because TSA's changes failed to address the lack of
redress procedures. The TSA's first attempt, CAPPS II, was never
implemented and their new program, Secure Flight, seems destined to the
same fate unless it addresses Congressional concerns.
To date, the TSA has failed to address the issue, seemingly
indifferent to the continual constitutional violations presented in falsely
identified passengers. The only remedy available to falsely identified
passengers at this point is to have a United States Court of Appeals compel
the agency to develop redress procedures. This is the only avenue for
passengers to receive a meaningful opportunity to be heard and have their
names removed from the list.
Part I of this Note establishes a factual background of the tragedies
of 9/11, a brief history of governmental responses to national tragedies, and a
story of a South Asian immigrant facing harassment at airports across the
country. Part 11 provides an understanding of aviation security prior to 9/11
then analyzes post 9/11 security measures. Specifically, Part II focuses on
the current procedures used by the government and airlines to ensure aviation
security and the development of new procedures designed to afford greater
protection while simultaneously protecting individual passenger's
constitutional rights. Of particular relevance to this Note is the promulgation
and use of government watch lists in order to ensure aviation safety.
Part Hm analyzes a failed attack on the government's use of the
terrorist watch lists in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington. Part IV establishes a legal understanding of
procedural due process. Part V then applies the due process framework to
passengers who are on government watch lists. Part VI incorporates the due
process analysis of Parts IV and V to present a legal strategy that will force
the TSA to adopt adequate grievance procedures for passengers falsely
identified on the government watch lists.
II. The Tragedies of 9/11
On September 11, 2001 the United States suffered the greatest
atrocity ever committed on its soil and the worst international terrorist attack
in history. On that day, 19 hijackers of Arab descent boarded four
transcontinental flights.2 The four planes originated at Boston's Logan
Airport, Washington's Dulles Airport, and Newark's Liberty International
2 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT,
4 (2004), http://www.9-1 1commission.gov/report/91 Report.pdf [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
12 WASH. & LEEJ. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
Airport. Bound for destinations in California, three to Los Angeles and one
to San Francisco, the planes never arrived at their destinations.4
The hijackers commandeered the planes and redirected their flight paths
to targets within our borders. At 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11
from Boston crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, killing
all passengers and thousands of people in the building.5 At 9:03 a.m., United
Airlines flight 175 out of Boston struck the South Tower of the World Trade
6Center, killing everyone on board and thousands of people in the building.
At 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the United States
Pentagon Building in Arlington, Virginia, killing all on board and many
people in the building.7 The final flight, United Airlines Flight 93 out of
Newark, did not fly to its destination, nor did it arrive at its intended target-
the passengers of the flight succeeded in retaking the plane and forcing the
hijackers to crash the plane into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.8 There
were no survivors of the flight, but those passengers will always be
remembered as heroes for being able to thwart the attack which was almost
certainly headed for another target in our nation's capital. 9
The attacks left nearly 3,000 people dead,'0 making it the deadliest attack
ever to be committed on American soil."1 The nation, united in the days after
the attack, committed itself to ensuring the safety of all its citizens and has
endeavored to secure its airports and airplanes. Many argue the United
States has been successful, as it has not endured another such incident, but
the constitutional sacrifices that many American citizens are forced to make
at airports may not be justified. National security is a paramount concern
that should not be treated lightly, but Americans must be cautious not to
overzealously pursue phantom security measures that do little more than turn
ordinary citizens into unfairly ostracized "suspects." A look at historical
responses to national tragedies may shed light on why caution is necessary
even in these troubling times.
3 Id. at 1-4.
4 Id. at 4-14.
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id. at8.
7 Id. at 10.
8 Id. at 10-14.
9 Id.
10 September 11, 2001 Victims List, http://www.septemberl 1victims.com/septemberl 1victims/
victimslist.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
" See Evan Thomas, The Day that Changed America, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2001, at 40
(chronicling the events of September 11 th, 2001).
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A Historical Perspective on Excessive
Responses to National'Tragedies
Every major horror of history was committed in the name of an
altruistic motive. 12
The truth behind those words can easily be understood by looking at
America's historical responses to national tragedies. During the Civil War,
President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, 13 and as a
result thousands of civilians were imprisoned. 14 In Ex Parte Milligan,15 the
Supreme Court held that President Lincoln had exceeded his authority in
suspending the writ of habeas corpus while courts were still functioning.
16
Many view the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War
as a black mark on our nation's history, and only one example of an
overzealous and excessive response under the guise of national security.
17
Fifty years later, in 1917, the United States entered World War I. In
another example of an aggressive response that history has not treated well,
1 8
Congress passed the Espionage Act on June 15, 1917,19 allowing federal
authorities to prosecute over 2,000 people for their opposition to conscription
12 AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD 715 (Penguin 1943).
13 The Writ of Habeas Corpus is used to inquire into the lawfulness of a person's detention and
the power to suspend it is delegated to the legislative branch of our government under Article I, §9, Cl. 2
of the Constitution. See Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 455, 460
(2003) (referring to Lincoln's decision to suspend the writ of habeas corpus); Leigh A. Kite, Red
Flagging Civil Liberties and Due Process Rights of Airline Passengers: Will a Redesigned CAPPS II
System Meet the Constitutional Challenge?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1385, 1389 (2004) (citing Lincoln's
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus); Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism,
42 DUQ. L. REv. 663, 668 (2004) (chronicling the Civil War era suspension of the writ of habeas corpus).
14 See Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 668 (referring to the Civil War suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus); see also WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIEs IN WARTIME
222 (1998) (noting that over 13,000 were detained); MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LBERTY:
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 113-38 (Oxford 1991).
15 See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866) (finding that when the courts are still
open and when martial law is not in effect, defendants must be given full judicial process). In Milligan,
the petitioner was arrested and tried before a military tribunal and was subsequently imprisoned in a
military prison. Id. at 107. The Court found that the petitioner's rights were violated when he was denied
a trial by jury. Id. at 122-23. The Court also stated that a citizen's right of judicial process cannot be
replaced with martial law while the courts and government are still functioning regardless of whether or
not the country is at war. Id. at 119-22.
16 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 220-22 (1866) (finding that even during times of war martial law
is only appropriate when judicial process is unavailable because the courts are not open).
17 See Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 668 (referring to current perspectives of Lincoln's
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus); Wood supra note 13, at 460 (noting Lincoln's suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus); see also Kite supra note 13, at 1389 (citing the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus as a wartime deprivation of civil liberties).
18 Id.
19 Espionage Act, ch. 30 tit. I, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
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and their dissemination of Communist ideals. 20 The Supreme Court initially
upheld federal actions taken under the Espionage Act but, in the 50 years of
jurisprudence that followed, the Court overruled each of its World War I
decisions.E'
Perhaps the most harrowing example of an extreme response is the
internment of over 100,000 Japanese-Americans during World War 11.22
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066,23 which
forced people of Japanese descent to abandon their homes, liberty, and
22
dignity as they were shipped to internment camps. 24 The President alleged
that the success of the war hinged upon protection from espionage.25
Although this was not an absurd idea, the methods used to protect against
espionage were unnecessary, dehumanizing an entire minority population. In
Korematsu v. United States,26 the Supreme Court upheld the internment as
within the war power of both Congress and the President.27 President
Reagan finally made amends for this ghastly atrocity nearly fifty years later
when he officially apologized to Japanese-American internees.28 In addition,
20 See Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 668 (noting that federal authorities under the aegis of the
Espionage Act prosecuted more than 2,000 people); see also Holly Hawkins, A Sliding Scale Approach
for Evaluating the Terrorist Threat over the Internet, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 635 (2005) (discussing
prosecutions under the Espionage Act); Wood, supra note 13, at 460 (noting extensive prosecutions and
convictions under the Espionage and Sedition Acts).
21 Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 668-69; see also Wood, supra note 13, at 460 (indicating that
protections for civil liberties re-emerged following the end of the war); Hawkins, supra note 19, at
635-37 (discussing the evolution of the "clear and present danger" doctrine).
22 Alan Brinkley, A Familiar Story: Lessons from Past Assaults on Freedoms, in THE WAR ON
OUR FREEDOMS 23, 40-42 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003); see also Kite supra note 13,
at 1388 (referring to the removal of Japanese-Americans from their homes to internment camps);
Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 669 (chronicling the World War I Japanese-American internment camps).
23 Executive Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942).
24 See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
20-22 (Temple University Press 2004) (discussing the internment of Japanese-Americans during World
War II).
25 Brinkley, supra note 21, at 23, 40-42; Kite, supra note 13, at 1389; Rosenzweig, supra note
13, at 669.
26 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (concluding that Roosevelt's
Executive Order imposing restrictions on Japanese-Americans was valid). In Korematsu, the Supreme
Court addressed a challenge to Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 which imposed various restrictions on
Japanese-Americans residing on the West Coast. Id. at 217. Petitioner was convicted of violating an
exclusion order promulgated under that order. Id. at 216. The Court found that although the order was
suspect because it limited the rights of a specific racial group, it was within the discretion of the war-
making branches-Executive and Legislative-of government to take such measures to ensure the safety
of the nation. Id. at 216-18. The Court determined that the government should have power to take
extreme measures to protect the country when it is under a dire threat even though the exclusion of one
group is not historically consistent with national principles. Id. at 219-20.
27 ld. at 217-18.
28 Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 669; see also Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S.
Disregard for International Law in the World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians-A Case Study,
40 B.C. L. REV. 275, 321 (1998) (referring to Reagan's response); Hilary K. Josephs, The Remedy of
Apology in Comparative and International Law: Self-Healing and Reconciliation, 18 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 53, 76 (2004) (discussing the Federal government's apology to affected Japanese-Americans).
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Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, awarding reparations to
each internee.29
The historical record looms ominously over America's current
reaction to terrorism and demands the most effective means to combat
terrorism without becoming overzealous and disenfranchising the Arab-
American population. Though the United States is faced with what has
proven to be a difficult and elusive enemy without borders, Americans must
remember that their fellow countrymen are not the enemy. In fact, neither
Arabs nor Muslims, as entire groups, are the enemy; rather, it is the actions
of a few that the nation must be guarded against. A well-balanced approach
that protects our country and yet does not sacrifice individuals' constitutional
rights is pivotal in winning the war on terrorism. As Senator Russ Feingold
elaborated in the days following September 1 lth, "We will lose [the war
against terrorism] without a shot being fired if we sacrifice the liberties of the
American people in the belief that by doing so we will stop terrorists. '3 °
B. My Mother's Story
The week of June 13, 2004 began like any other for my mother, a
consultant for one of the largest corporations in the world. She awoke early
in the morning and called a taxi cab to take her the 15 miles to Washington
D.C.'s Reagan National Airport. She was scheduled to board a flight from
Reagan to Milwaukee's General Mitchell Airport in order to attend a
corporate training session. At the electronic check-in kiosk, my mother was
surprised to learn that she could not use the machine. As an experienced
traveler, this frustrated her immensely; she had never encountered problems
with the machine before. Per the directions on the screen, my mother stood
in line to see the next available ticketing agent. When she finally reached the
ticket counter, my mother was surprised to learn that this was not going to be
a routine check-in.
The agent informed her that she was going to have to undergo
additional security measures before being issued her boarding pass. Initially
believing that she had been randomly selected, my mother waited patiently
for about half an hour, understanding the realities of air travel in a post 9/11
world. A TSA agent finally came to the counter and asked her to retrieve her
luggage and follow him. The TSA agent then began asking her a series of
questions to verify her identity, destination, and reason for travel. After
about an hour of questioning, my mother was cleared to fly and just barely
29 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
30 147 CONG. REC. S10, 570 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (Statement of Sen. Fiengold).
12 WASH. & LEE J. CR. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
made her flight. She didn't think twice about the incident until she tried to
return home.
That Thursday, my mother was scheduled to return to National
Airport, but was surprised to find that she was again selected for additional
security measures before being allowed to board her flight. She chalked it up
to a random coincidence and complied with the instructions of the airline and
TSA agent. Again, after a delay of about an hour and half, she was issued
her boarding pass and allowed to fly.
The next week, my mother resumed her consulting duties and was
scheduled to fly from Washington DC to New York City before flying from
New York to Boston, then returning home. At each airport, she was stopped
and required to undergo additional screening. At this point my mother
realized that this was no freak accident. She called the TSA on June 24,
2004 in order to determine why she was being stopped each time she flew.
Unable to reach anyone, she left a message and her contact information. On
July 12, 2004, the TSA responded via e-mail that she should submit a written
request documenting exactly what events had occurred. In the two week
period it took the TSA to respond, my mother had flown another 6 times,
with the same result at each airport.
On August 2, 2004 my mother submitted a written complaint
documenting each incident. The TSA responded on August 4, 2004,
informing her that she needed to fill out a Passenger Identity Verification
Form (PIVF)31 because her name matched or was similar to a person on a
Federal Watch List. The PIVF form looks simple and unassuming, but
32requires much information. My mother completed the PIVF and sent it to
the TSA on August 9, 2004.
Despite numerous calls in the coming months from both my mother
and the legal team of her corporation there was no correspondence from the
TSA. In the rare event that someone actually answered the phone, the
response was the same: "we are working on it." In the meantime, my mother
was stopped for additional screening every single time she flew. It became
so second nature to her that she always allotted an extra hour or two just to
ensure that she wouldn't miss her flight. Finally, on December 13, 2004, my
mother received a letter from TSA stating that her identity had been verified.
Interestingly enough, the letter also stated that TSA did not have the ability
31 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PASSENGER IDENTITY VERIFICATION FORM,
http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/PIVForm.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2006) [hereinafter PIVF].
32 Id. The PIVF requires personal information such as name, address, sex, place of birth, date of
birth, social security number, height, weight, hair color, eye color, and both home and work telephone
numbers. Id at 3. In addition to this information, the document also requires copies of three of the
following documents: passport, birth certificate, naturalization certificate, voter registration card, driver's
license, government identity card, or military identity card. Id. The copies must be notarized save for
birth certificates, which must be certified. Id.
266
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to remove her name from the list but that she would be added to a cleared
list. My mother was immensely relieved that her ordeal was over and that
she could fly again without any extra delays, as flying to various locations is
essential to her livelihood. Since being placed on a "cleared list" my mother
has had to endure relatively little trouble, but has been stopped twice since
for additional screening.
III. Aviation Security
A. Pre 9/11 Aviation Security: Learning from Past Mistakes
The events of September 11, 2001 are not the only time the United
States has had to face terrorist threats through its airways. In trying to
understand the current system and the procedures in place, it is necessary to
have a solid foundation in the infrastructure that the United States
government has developed in trying to combat terrorism.
Congress first addressed the issue of airline safety in 1958 when it
enacted the Federal Aviation Act.33 Under the act, Congress created the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and gave it the authority to
propagate and utilize regulations to ensure the safety of air passengers and
cargo.34 The first major challenge for the FAA occurred in late 1960s when
airline hijackings rose dramatically; with nearly 200 hijackings worldwide
from 1968-1970. 35 The FAA responded by creating a Task Force that was
charged with establishing procedures to minimize the risk of hijackings;
pivotal to the new system was the use of magnetometers 36 and searches of
individuals who triggered them. 37  The Task Force's attempt at curbing
hijacking, however, turned out to be an incredible failure.38 One of the most
33 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. at 49 U.S.C. 14101 (2002)).
34 49 U.S.C. 40113 (2005).
35 See Gregory Schroer, Doomed to Repeat the Past: How the TSA is Picking Up Where the FAA
Left Off, 32 TRANsp. L. J. 73, 75 (2004) (indicating that the incidence of hijackings was "extremely high"
from 1968-1969); see also Sanford L. Dow, Airport Security, Terrorism, and the Fourth Amendment: A
Look Back and a Step Forward, 58 J. Am L. & COM. 1149, 1159 (1993) (explaining that in 1968 there
were eighteen successful hijackings of American planes and thirty-three in 1969).
36 A magnetometer is an "instrument used to detect the presence of a metallic object or to
measure the intensity of a magnetic field." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Definition of
Magnetometer, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/magnetometer (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
37 See Schroer, supra note 34, at 75-76 (observing that the FAA Task Force's initial anti-
hijacking system included the use of anti-hijacker magnetometers and searches of individuals who
triggered those magnetometers); Michael J. DeGrave, Airline Passenger Profiling and the Fourth
Amendment: Will CAPPS H Be Cleared for Takeoff?, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 125, 129 (2004) (noting
that since 1973, all passengers and carry-on baggage have been subjected to magnetometer searches).
38 See John Rogers, Bomb, Borders, and Boarding: Combating International Terrorism at United
States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 501, 506 (1997)
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telling indications of why the system was a failure, showing that we do not
learn from history, is that the FAA and the Task Force called for the airlines
to implement and run the new security measures themselves.39
In order to address the number of hijackings, Congress enacted the
Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974.40 Under the new act, the President was
authorized to suspend all air service to any nation that was suspected of
allowing terrorists or terrorist organizations to use their country as a base or
refuge. 41 Additionally, the act imposed severe penalties on anyone engaged
in air piracy.42 The new regulations seemed to be working as there was a
significant decrease in hijackings of American planes during the 1970s with
only 25 hijackings reported in the U.S. from 1973-1978. 43
The 1980's, however, proved to be a different story, as hijacking
increased, with 74 hijackings occurring in the U.S. from 1979-1985," and
terrorist organizations got bolder with their attempts. Traditional methods of
hijacking, such as armed men taking over planes, proved to be a difficult task
for hijackers as a result of the use of magnetometers. In response, hijackers
altered their approach to incorporate more deadly means of achieving their
goals. Hijackers turned to gasoline and explosives, undetectable by
magnetometers,45 showing their propensity to adapt in order to defeat
security measures. Numerous planes were subjected to the terror of bombs
exploding on board during the 1980s with the most traumatic being the
explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988; the flight, which left London's
Heathrow airport destined for JFK in New York, exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland, killing all 259 people on board, along with 11 on the ground. 46
Under intense pressure to increase air safety, President George H.W. Bush
(demonstrating that in spite of the FAA Task Force's efforts, there were 125 hijackings between 1968 and
1973).
39 See Schroer, supra note 35, at 76 (noting that the Task Force placed the responsibility for
implementation of the plan in the hands of the airlines themselves).
40 Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. 46501, 44901 (1994)).
41 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against Terrorism,
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 699 (2003) (explaining that the Antihijacking Act of 1974 granted the
President emergency powers to suspend air service to countries suspected to be refuges or bases of
operation for terrorists).
42 See Douglas Kash, Abductions of Terrorists in International Airspace and on the High Seas, 8
FLA. J. INT'L. L. 65, 77 (1993) (stating that the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974 imposes criminals penalties on
terrorists who hijack or attempt to hijack planes).
43 BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, WORLDWIDE CIVIL AVIATION HUACKINGS:
1970-2000, http://www.bts.gov/publications/transportation-statisticsannual-report/200l/html/chapter_
05_figure-01114 table.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
Id.
45 Kash, supra note 42, at 77.
46 Kent C. Krause, Putting the Transportation Security Administration in Historical Context, 68
J. AIR. L. & COM. 233, 238 (2003); see also Rogers, supra note 38, at 509 (indicating that the Pan Am
Flight 103 Hijacking was the worst terrorist-related incident in United States aviation history to that date).
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issued Executive Order 12,686, which established a commission to evaluate
the FAA's performance in securing air travel.47 The commission returned a
scathing report of the FAA that indicated that aviation security was not as
high a priority as it should be, and even more telling, that there was a severe
"lack of coordination and communication between the State Department, the
FAA, and the American intelligence gathering community.',48  If these
findings sound familiar, they should: the 9/11 Commission made very similar
findings nearly 15 years later.49
B. Post 9/11 Security
With the tragedies of September 11, the United States government
again undertook a sweeping reform of air travel security in an effort to secure
the nation from similar threats. As a direct response to the attacks, Congress
passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),5 ° which
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as part of the
Department of Transportation (DOT).5' When the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) was created in 2003, DHS assumed control of the TSA.52
The TSA was granted broad authority in ensuring the safety of the
nation's transportation systems.53 Aviation security was of particular
importance to the creation of the organization, which is appropriate
considering the nature of the 9/11 attacks.54 One of the specific mandates of
the ATSA, a mandate which is the focus of this note, is to use intelligence
information from government agencies and federal databases in order to
identify individuals who may pose a risk to aviation security.55
47 Exec. Order No. 12,686, 54 Fed. Reg. 32, 629 (Aug. 4, 1989).
4 Nancy Jean Strantz, Aviation Security and Pan Am Flight 103: What Have We Learned?, 56 J.
AIR L. & COM. 413, 464 (1990); see generally Findings and Recommendations of the Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism, 136 CONG. REC. S6270 (1990) (statement of Mr. Lautenberg).
49 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at xvi (noting that the institutions charged with
protecting our borders, civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave the threat of
terrorism could be and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or defeat it).
50 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
[hereinafter ATSA]; Schroer, supra note 34, at 81.
51 ATSA, § 114(a).
52 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
53 See Schroer, supra note 35, at 82 (noting that the TSA was given broad powers to ensure
aviation security); Dempsey, supra note 41, at 714 (stating that in 2001 the U.S. Congress granted the
TSA all aviation security functions previously performed by the FAA and the responsibility to regulate
aviation security for all transportation modes).
54 ATSA, §114 (f)(1-15).
55 ATSA, §114 (h)(l-3).
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1. The Current System
Even though the TSA was created in 2001, not much has been
accomplished in trying to achieve the aforementioned goal. The TSA has
made significant strides in other areas of airline security56 but has failed to
make improvements in identifying and restricting potential terrorists.57 The
system currently used to screen potential threats, Computer Assisted
Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS), was first used by Northwest
Airlines in 1996 with other airlines beginning to use the system in 1998. 58
CAPPS uses behavioral characteristics of passengers, such as duration of
trip, cash payment, and last-minute reservations, in order to screen those who
may pose a threat.59 In addition to CAPPS, airlines are given government
watch lists that contain suspected terrorist names.6°  The airlines are
responsible for corroborating their passenger lists against the government
watch lists to ensure that suspected terrorists do not board flights.61 Due to
concerns about sharing sensitive information with private firms and foreign
countries the airlines are not provided with the entire lists and many
identifying characteristics are not supplied.62
The government provides the airlines with two different lists. 63 The
no-fly list contains the names of passengers who are barred from flying
unless cleared by law enforcement agents, and the selectee list contains the
names of passengers who are issued boarding passes but must undergo
additional security measures before being allowed to fly. 64 These Federal
Watch Lists are maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The
TSC is an interagency effort administered by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that includes the DHS, Department of Justice, Department of
56 See Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 712 (indicating that the TSA has made changes in airport
security focused on looking for potential weapons); see also Krause, supra note 46, at 247-51
(identifying improvements to check-in procedures).
57 See Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 712 (noting that the current screening system does not
attempt to determine whether or not the federal government has information that may connect a specific
prospective passenger with terrorism or criminal activity that may indicate that they are a threat to the
flight).
58 Id.
59 Kite, supra note 13, at 1394.
60 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: SECURE FLIGHT
DEVELOPMENT UNDER WAY, BUT RISKS SHOULD BE MANAGED AS SYSTEM IS FURTHER DEVELOPED,
GAO-05-356, at 56, Mar. 2005, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05356.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2006)
[hereinafter SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT].
61 Id.
62 See id. at 54-56 (discussing how the TSA only collects information that is "relevant and
necessary" to accomplish the purposes of the agency).
63 Id. at 56.
64 Id.; Federal Aviation Administration Security Directive 108-01-20 (the No-Fly List) and
Federal Aviation Administration Security Directive 108-01-21 (the Selectee List). For the purposes of




State, and intelligence community representatives. The TSC does not
gather any intelligence information nor is it responsible for adding or
removing names from the lists; it performs a solely administrative role in
ensuring national security.66
Once a passenger has been flagged as a possible threat to aviation, it
is extremely difficult for them to adequately challenge the designation.
Under the current system, no adequate redress procedures are available to
these passengers.67 As indicated by my mother's story, the passenger has the
opportunity to complete a Passenger Identity Verification Form, but the
effectiveness of being placed on a so-called "cleared list" is extremely
uncertain because there are no formal procedures for permanent removal
from the watch lists in place.68 Of particular interest is the fact that there are
no redress procedures for those inappropriately placed on watch lists.
6 9
2. CAPPS H: An Attempt That Never Took Off
In January of 2003, the TSA made an attempt to ensure aviation
security by issuing a notice outlining new procedures that were aimed at
identifying passengers who posed a potential threat. 70  After receiving
comments addressing potential privacy concerns, civil liberty issues, the
scope of the program, and adequate redress procedures,71 the TSA issued an
interim final notice on August 1, 2003 outlining the new system and the
methods used.7 2 The CAPPS II system was designed to screen all
passengers traveling in the United States.73 The government would collect
passenger information via a Passenger Name Record (PNR) that would be
supplied either by the airlines themselves or by a global distribution
system.74 The PNR would contain the passenger's name, address, telephone
number, date of birth, and itinerary, and would be forwarded to commercial
65 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRESS RELEASE: TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER
FACT SHEET, Sept. 16, 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=1598.
66 Id.
67 See SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 60, at 56 (discussing how the current system
often results in unnecessary delays or complete denial of boarding).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 56-57.
70 68 Fed. Reg. 2101 (Jan. 15, 2003); Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 713; see Kite, supra note
13, at 1396 (discussing how the Notice proposes that risk assessment be "based upon information
provided by the passengers, reservation information from the airports, risk assessment reports, and law
enforcement and intelligence information").
71 See 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265 (Aug. 1, 2003) (stating that "substantial comments were received in
response to the prior Privacy Act Notice").
72 Id.
73 See id. ("CAPPS II is intended to conduct risk assessments and authentications for passengers
traveling by air to, from or within the United States.").
74 Id.
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data providers to verify the passenger's identity against commercial
databases. 7' The commercial data providers would then send a numerical
authentication score for each passenger indicating their confidence in the
passenger's identity.76 Then, the government would use this score in order to
conduct a risk assessment for each passenger." A critical function of the risk
assessment is to check the passenger's identity against the Federal Watch
Lists to ensure that known terrorists or those with identifiable links to
terrorist organizations do not board airplanes.78 A very important distinction
between CAPPS II and CAPPS is that the government, not the airlines, takes
control of assessing whether or not a passenger is on a Federal Watch List.
7 9
One of the problems with the system, however, was that all PNRs were
destroyed after use, rendering any meaningful opportunity to contest a
determination moot.80  In fact, this was such a problem that Congress
specifically forbade the TSA and DHS from implementing the system until
they provided written certification indicating the redress procedures for
passengers mistakenly identified as potential threats under CAPPS II.81 By
January 1, 2004, the TSA and DHS had only addressed one of the many
concerns of Congress, leaving unaddressed the adequacy of redress
procedures.8 2 CAPPS II was never given the chance to become operational as





79 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 393 (recommending that the TSA assume
control of screening passengers against the Federal Watch Lists).
80 See 68 Fed. Reg. 45,265 (discussing how the insignificant PNR data retention time in the
CAPPS system made it nearly impossible to conduct a successful record access request).
81 Vision 100-Century Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 §607
(codified at 49 U.S.C. 44903 (2003)). The certification also required information on: error rates and false
positives, accuracy of the predictive assessment of potential threats, Security of Homeland Security's
internal controls and oversight, reduction of abuse through the use of operational safeguards, security
measures against hackers, and privacy concerns. Id.
82 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AVIATION
SECURITY: COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING FACES SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION
CHALLENGES, GAO-04-385, at 4, Feb. 2004, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO4385.pdf.
83 Audrey Hudson, Privacy Worries Doom Screening Plan for Airlines, WASH. TIMES, July 16,
2004, at A7; Mimi Hall and Alan Levin, Revised Flier-Screening Plan in Works, USA TODAY, July 16,
2004, at 3A (Secretary of DHS discontinues CAPPS II); Beth Gorham, U.S. Drops Colour-Coded Air
Security Plan, LONDON FREE PRESS, July 17, 2004, at A3.
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3. Secure Flight: Doomed to Repeat the Past?
As CAPPS II suffered an untimely death at the hands of civil
libertarians and Congress, the TSA unveiled a new program: Secure Flight.
84
Under Secure Flight, the government took control from individual airlines
the checking of passenger names against the Federal Watch Lists.85 This
change allowed for expanded Watch Lists containing information not
available to airlines to be utilized in an effort to reduce the number of false
86positives . Notably, Secure Flight claims to ensure adequate redress
procedures for passengers who have been falsely identified in order to ensure
that they are not continuously harassed at airports.87 Secure Flight also tests
the use of commercial databases to see if they prove useful in verifying
passengers' identities by using PNRs.88
Congress has expressed concerns over the implementation and
development of the Secure Flight program and has limited any funding of the
program to testing until the GAO has had an opportunity to address the areas
of Congressional concern.89  Again, one of the main areas of concern is
ensuring that passengers are granted adequate redress procedures to remove
their names from the Federal Watch Lists in order to ensure that they are free
from constant harassment.90
The GAO released a report in March of 2005 addressing the
concerns of Congress.91 Among the findings of the GAO is that, as of
publication of the report, the TSA has yet to provide a detailed plan of how
exactly passengers who are falsely identified will be allowed to seek
redress.92 Generally, the TSA plans to include a procedure in which
passengers are able to challenge their inclusion on the watch lists by working
8 See 69 Fed. Reg. 57345 (Sept. 24, 2004) (describing "Secure Flight Test Records" as a
program that "will compare the identifying information of airline passengers contained in passenger name
records (PNRs) to the identifying information of individuals in the Terrorist Screening Database of the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)").
85 See id. ("Th[e] screening function should be performed by TSA and it should utilize the larger
set of watch lists maintained by the Federal Government.").
86 See id. (discussing the security benefits and improved efficiency provide by the comparison
between expanded TSA No-Fly and Selectee Lists and "suspicious indicators associated with travel
behavior, as identified in the passenger's itinerary-specific PNR").
87 See id. (noting that "[s]ecure Flight will automate the vast majority of watch list comparisons;
will allow TSA to apply more consistent procedures where automated resolution of potential matches is
not possible; and will allow for more consistent response procedures at airports for those passengers
identified as potential matches").
88 Id.
89 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 §522, Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118
Stat. 1298 (2004).
90 See generally id. (listing Congress' various areas of concern regarding the Secure Flight
system, with redress listed first at §522(1)).
91 SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 60, at i.
92 Id. at 56.
12 WASH. & LEEJ. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
with the TSC.93 Additionally, the TSA plans to include an appeals process
that is currently unavailable to passengers.94 The TSA has yet to release any
specific initiatives or procedures that it will use in assuring that passengers'
due process rights are not compromised by Secure Flight in the same manner
as the current system.95 Since the TSA is still in the testing phase of Secure
Flight, it does not deem the redress procedure as a necessary prior for
implementation.96 Even though Congress has continually requested and
mandated that passengers' due process rights not be abridged,97 the TSA
does not seem to think that protecting constitutional rights are a priority.
Unless adequate procedures are put in place, Secure Flight will
follow down the footsteps of CAPPS II, and America will again be left
without screening measures that protect American aviation from terrorists.
The United States will be left with a system that is almost 8 years old 98 and
failed to prevent the 9/11 attacks, while ordinary citizens are continuously
harassed, with no means to correct the infringements on their constitutional
rights.
IV. An Unsuccessful Attack on the Constitutionality of the
Lists: Green v. Transportation Security Administration
The watch lists used by the TSA and airport officials have been
highly scrutinized, as evidenced by Congress' interest in the matter.
Additionally, many groups devoted to protecting civil liberties have taken an
interest in the watch lists.99 On January 7, 2005, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington decided the first and only court
challenge of the use of the government watch lists in Green v.
93 Id. at 57.
94 Id.
95 See 70 Fed. Reg. 36,320 (June 22, 2005) (ensuring that a "robust" redress procedure will be
used in conjunction with Secure Flight, but failing to implement a final program).
96 See 69 Fed. Reg. 65,619 (Nov. 15, 2004) (discussing how redress procedures are not necessary
for the testing phase because the data has already been collected).
97 See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, supra note 89, at § 522(1)
(implying that the current system does not comport with due process by requesting a new system with an
adequate appeals process).
98 See Krause, supra note 56, at 250 (discussing controversial rules issued by the TSA through its
broad grant of power under CAPPS II and the lack of judicial review on the agency's authority).
99 See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Government Agency Releases Documents
on "No Fly" List; ACLU Says Many Questions Still Remain Unanswered (July 22, 2003)
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/16797prs20030722.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2006) (detailing the
ACLU's displeasure with the TSA's management of its "no-fly" lists); see also Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), Documents Show Errors in TSA's "No Fly" and "Selectee" Watch Lists,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watchlist foiaanalysis.htnl (last visited Mar. 14, 2006)
(describing potential problems with the TSA's "intrusive passenger profiting schemes").
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Transportation Security Administration.'00 The plaintiffs in this matter
brought multiple claims relating to use of the watch lists. First, the plaintiffs
made a broad constitutional attack invoking the Fifth Amendment right to
due process.1 ' Second, the plaintiffs alleged that their Fourth Amendment
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures were violated by
the defendants in administering and maintaining the watch lists. 10 2 As relief,
the plaintiffs sought "some remedy that would allow Plaintiffs to avoid the
ongoing and repeated investigations, interrogations, detention, delays and
enhanced searches that they've experienced virtually every time they fly.'
1 °0 3
The challenge was unsuccessful and the District Court dismissed the claim
for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 10 4
Under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a), 10 5 Congress has explicitly delegated
exclusive jurisdiction over final orders issued by the Secretary of
Transportation, the Under Secretary, or the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia or the United States Court of Appeals for the district in
which the plaintiff resides.'0 6 The Green court found that the Security
Directives used to promulgate the watch lists were final orders issued by the
TSA. 10 7 As such the court found that any claims relating to the maintenance,
100 Green v. Trans. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005). In Green, the
Supreme Court considered whether the TSA's adoption, maintenance, and dissemination of no-fly and
selectee lists was unconstitutional, as challenged by innocent airline passengers with names similar to
those on these lists. Id. According to the Green Court, the TSA's Security Directives that established
these lists were "orders" over which the Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction, and because these
orders were inescapably intertwined with a review of the procedures and merits surrounding adoption of
these lists, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' Due Process and Fourth
Amendment challenges. Id. at 1125, 1126. The Fifth Amendment Due Process claim as it related to the
clearance procedures established by the TSA was the only claim not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but
because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to that claim, plaintiffs'
complaint was dismissed in entirety. Id. at 1126.
101 Id. at 1126.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1127 (quoting the plaintiffs' attorney at oral argument).
104 Id. at 1130.
105 See 49 U.S.C. §46110(a) (2005) ("A person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued
by the Secretary of Transportation (or the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security with respect to
security duties and powers designated to be carried out by the Under Secretary or the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration with respect to aviation duties and powers designated to be carried out
by the Administrator) ... may apply for review of the order by filing a petition for review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the United States
for the circuit in which the person resides or has its principal place of business.").
106 49 U.S.C. §46110(a) (2005). This grant of jurisdiction to the court of appeals relates directly
to any orders issued with authority vested in 49 U.S.C. §46110 or of orders issued under 49 U.S.C.
§114(l) or (s). The Security Directives which created the watch lists were issued under 49 U.S.C.
§114(l)(2)(a). Green, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
107 Green, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-25
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administration, or use of the watch lists would fall under the jurisdiction of
the United States Courts of Appeals, and thus dismissed them. 0 8
The Green court severed the constitutional challenges to the use and
administration of the lists, finding that they did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the claims, and proceeded solely with the claims related to the
clearance procedures used by the TSA. 09 The plaintiffs' only remaining
claim was a Fifth Amendment due process challenge to the lack of adequate
grievance procedures for persons falsely identified by the lists." 10
The plaintiffs alleged that the clearance procedures used by the TSA
do not provide adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard and
thus violate their Fifth Amendment due process rights."' For a due process
challenge to be successful, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been
deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.' 12 In this
proceeding, the plaintiffs did not allege a deprivation of property; instead, the
plaintiffs claimed that their constitutionally protected liberty interests were
being violated." 13  The Green court did not entertain this claim for the
previously mentioned jurisdictional issues.1 14  The only claim the court
recognized was a "stigma-plus" claim under the Fifth Amendment.!
1 5
Under the "stigma-plus" prong of due process, a plaintiff must
demonstrate "public disclosure of a stigmatizing statement by the
government, the accuracy of which is contested; plus [...] the denial of some
more tangible interest such as employment, or the alteration of a right or
status recognized by state law." 116 The Green court went on to find that,
although the plaintiffs had suffered stigmatizing statements at the hands of
the government, they had failed to state a tangible harm that would rise to the
level of a Constitutional deprivation and, as such, failed the "plus prong" of
the "stigma-plus" test. 117 The court dismissed the action under Rule 12(b) (6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
18
In the next section, a more in-depth analysis of constitutional due
process is laid out. Since the Green court did not address these issues, I
believe that a successful attack on the watch lists can be launched as long as
108 Green, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1127-28.
109 ld.
110 Id. at 1128.
III Id. A more comprehensive analysis of constitutional due process is available in Part IV.




116 Id. (citing Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 982 (9th Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added).
117 Id. at 1130.
M1 Id.
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the claim is filed in the appropriate court--one of the United States Courts of
Appeals.
V. Constitutional Due Process Requirement
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.119
The due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment is well
established in our nation's jurisprudence and is applicable to the Federal
government; the Fourteenth Amendment extends this requirement to the
states. 20  Due process is understood as the oportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 1 For the due process clause
to be implicated, a liberty or property interest must be infringed upon by
governmental action. Once it is established that either a liberty or property
interest has been implicated, it is necessary to determine the level of process
due to the individual.
123
A. Liberty and Property Interests are at Stake
When airline passengers purchase plane tickets, they not only have a
property interest at stake-they also have a liberty interest in airline travel,
both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, business passengers
have an additional property interest beyond the cost of the purchased ticket.
"9 U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added).
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
121 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965)) (internal quotations omitted).
122 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
123 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976) (recognizing that Social Security benefits
are a property interest and the government must afford an individual due process before terminating the
benefits, the question on Mathews is the amount of process due); see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972) ("Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.");
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975) (quoting Morrissey).
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1. The Liberty Interest at Stake
The Supreme Court has not used rigid formalistic definitions of
liberty in deciding whether or not procedural due process applies.' 24 Liberty
has been broadly defined and not limited solely to bodily restraint.121 The
definition of liberty addresses many different aspects of life, but the source
of protected liberty may come either from state law or the Federal
Constitution.
26
The Supreme Court, for over 150 years, has recognized a right to
travel that should be protected. 12 7  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
explicitly called the right to travel a liberty interest that is to be protected by
the Fifth Amendment's requirement of due process, even going so far as to
insinuate that it is as important "as the choice of what [one] eats, or wears, or
reads." 128  Within the right to travel, however, a distinction must be made
between interstate and international travel, as the court has interpreted the
two differently. 129 The Secure Flight program and the Federal Watch Lists
will only be used to screen passengers flying domestically within the United
States and, as such, it is unnecessary to analyze the right to international
travel for the purposes of this note.
130
124 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 ("While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty ... guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denote5 not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.") (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399) (internal quotations omitted).
125 Id.
126 Ernest Schopler, Annotation: The Supreme Court's Views as to Concept of "Liberty" Under
Due Process Clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 47 L. Ed. 2d 975, 981 (1977).
127 Gregory Hartch, Symposium: Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability:
Comment: Wrong Turns: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Right to Travel Cases, 21 WM. MrrCHELL L.
REV. 457, 458-59 (1995) (describing the history of the right to travel as defined by the Supreme Court);
Kite supra note 13, at 1407; Heather Reser, Comment: Airline Terrorism: The Effect of Tightened
Security on the Right to Travel, 63 J. AiR L. & CoM. 819, 836.
' Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958). "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 125.
129 See Kite, supra note 13, at 1407 (noting that the right to interstate travel is a fundamental right
whereas the right to international travel is only a freedom); see also Reser, supra note127, at 832-37
(distinguishing between the right to international travel and the fundamental right to interstate travel);
Jaime Rhee, Comment: Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline Safety in the Face of Terrorist
Threats, 49 DEPAuL L. REV. 847, 859 (2005) ("Generally, the right to interstate travel has been regarded
as fundamental and subject to very few restrictions, whereas the right to international travel is subject to a
somewhat greater level of interference.").
130 SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 60, at 11. "Secure Flight will also only prescreen
passengers flying domestically within the United States, rather than passengers flying into and out of the
United States." Id.
PLANE HARASSMENT
The Supreme Court has continuously viewed the right to interstate
travel as a fundamental liberty interest.' 31  Being a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Constitution, any infringement upon the right to
travel will be subject to strict scrutiny. 132  Even though the right to travel,
generally, is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny, restrictions on a
single mode of travel, i.e. air travel, may not be constitutionally protected.
133
In Shapiro, however, the court indicated that any rules or regulations that
unreasonably burden or restrict free travel could not be upheld.
134
2. The Property Interests at Stake
In restricting passengers from flying two separate property interests
are at stake: the passenger's ticket cost and a statutory entitlement to air
travel. 35 In determining whether a property interest is at stake, the Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution itself does not create property
interests. 136  Alternatively, property interests are defined by an analysis of
131 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). "The constitutional right to travel from
one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right
that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized .... Although the Articles of Confederation
provided that 'the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State,'
that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so
elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the
Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution." Id. (emphasis added); see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (recognizing the right to travel to be a fundamental right under our
Constitution).
132 Id. at 634. "[I]n moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia, appellees were
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right,
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Id.
133 See City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that there is no
"constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel").
134 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decisions of three district courts that held unconstitutional certain statutory provisions that denied welfare
assistance to residents of the state or district who had not resided within the jurisdiction for more than one
year prior to applying for welfare. Id. at 621-22. The appeals were consolidated from three-judge district
court decisions in the District of Connecticut, District of Columbia, and Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 622-27. In each case, persons were denied financial assistance under the programs Aid to Families
with Dependent Children or Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, programs jointly funded by the
States and the Federal government. Id. In defense of the provisions, it was argued that they were
necessary to protect against an influx of dependents from other states seeking a more generous public
assistance program. Id. at 628-29. The Court found this to be a constitutionally impermissible purpose
because it served to inhibit interstate migration, and thus infringed on the constitutional right to travel. Id.
at 629-31. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the one-year waiting period restriction served no
compelling government interest and was a clear equal protection violation. Id. at 638.
135 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (2005); Kite, supra note 13, at 1416-18; Reser, supra note 127, at
839.
136 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 ("Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.").
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independent sources which create or establish the interest. 37 For a property
interest to be implicated, an individual must have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the interest.
38
When an airline passenger purchases a ticket, he or she enters into a
contractual relationship with the airline. 3 9  The contractual relationship
entered into between the passenger and the airline guarantees the passenger a
seat on the flight in return for adequate consideration in the form of money.
When an airline is unable to board a passenger, the airline will normally
refund the passenger's purchase cost or try to board the passenger on an
alternate flight. 4 As is evidenced by the nature of the relationship entered
into between the passenger and the airline, a claim of entitlement to air travel
exists that the government cannot deprive without due process.
In addition to the contractual relationship that creates a property
interest, citizens of the United States are granted a statutory entitlement to
airline travel.14 1  The Supreme Court has long recognized that when the
government creates a right through a statute, individuals have a protected
property interest in that right, even if the right is only a privilege. 42  This
statutory entitlement is, however, qualified by allowing airlines the right to
refuse travel to any passenger who does not acquiesce to a search of his
person and luggage or when the airline deems the passenger to be a safety
threat.1
43
B. Determining the Amount of Process Due
As it has been established that airline passengers have both a
fundamental liberty interest in interstate travel as well as a property interest
in their airline tickets, the next relevant question is what process is due. 144
137 Id.
138 Id.; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
139 See Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne, 242 F. Supp.
129, 144-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (noting that [e]ach [airline] ticket constitutes the "contract made by the
parties"); Kite, at 1416.
140 Delta Airlines, Legal Notices, Liability for Delay or Cancellation,
http://www.delta.comlegallindex.jsp#refusal (last visited Dec. 5, 2005); United Airlines, United Airlines
Contract of Carriage Summary, http://www.united.com/pagetarticle/0,6722,2671,00.html?navSource=
RelatedLinks (last visited Mar. 16, 2005); American Airlines, Conditions of Carriage, http://www.aa.
com/content/customerService/customerCommitmentconditionsOfCarriage.jhtm (last visited Mar. 16,
2005).
141 49 U.S.C.S § 40103(a)(2) (2005). A citizen of the United States has a public right of transit
through the navigable airspace. Id.
142 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. "Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them." Id.
143 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2005).
I" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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The Court's fundamental understanding of due process necessitates that an
individual be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'
' 45
Again, as so much in the due process context, the Court has strayed
from using rigid formulistic approaches in favor of flexible individualized
inquiries into each particular situation. 146 The nature and timing of hearing,
whether it is post-deprivation or pre-deprivation, will hinge on a balancing of
three factors as enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.147 The three factors that
must be separately analyzed in order to determine the amount of process due
are: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
48
VI. Applying Due Process to Individuals on Federal Watch Lists
Airline passengers have both a fundamental liberty interest in
interstate travel as well as a property interest in their airline ticket, as noted
above. The relevant question is to effectively balance the three Mathews
factors in order to determine the amount of process due.
A. The Private Interest Affected by the Official Government Action
In analyzing the private interest that is affected, it is important to
remember the nature of the government action at issue. 49  When an
individual is placed on a Federal Watch List, their right to interstate travel is
145 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
'46 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
147 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the disabled Eldridge claimed that his due process rights
had been violated when his social security disability benefits were terminated without a formal evidentiary
hearing. Id. at 324. In making a preliminary decision to terminate benefits, the state agency relied on
physician and psychiatric reports, as well as the answers Eldridge provided in a completed questionnaire.
Id. at 323-24. Although Eldridge disputed the decision, he offered no additional evidence and the Social
Security Administration officially terminated his benefits. Id. No pre-termination evidentiary hearing
was provided, however, Eldridge was notified that he could seek a post-termination appeal and hearing.
Id. at 324. He elected instead to file suit. Id. In determining whether Eldridge received constitutionally
sufficient administrative review, the Supreme Court held that the decision rested on consideration of the
three distinct factors discussed above. Id. at 334-35. In balancing these factors, the Court found that
additional safeguards would impose significant burdens on the government and that the process currently
in place was adequate to provide fair consideration of individuals' claims. Id. at 347-49. The Court
found that an evidentiary hearing was not required in this proceeding and, therefore, there was no due
process violation. Id. at 349.
14 Id.
149 Id.
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substantially burdened. This is especially true in the context of business
travelers who rely on air travel as a means to secure their very livelihood. In
the particular case of my mother, traveling to various cities across the
country with speed is a requisite of her job. Without the ability to travel by
air, she would not be able to perform her job and as a consequence would be
fired. As indicated by her story, a typical week for her can consist of flying
up to 4 times a week in order to attend to various contractual obligations that
she and her company have made. By having to arrive at each airport much
earlier than other passengers, she is deprived of many hours per week, and,
as the old adage goes, time is money. A conservative estimate of this
additional time- one hour per airport, multiplied by an average of 3 flights
per week- yields 156 hours wasted per year. In the context of a traditional 40
hour work week, this delay costs nearly a month of work time per year. As
the right to interstate travel is a fundamental liberty that is substantially
burdened by being placed on the Watch Lists, the government must have a
compelling interest in burdening that right which is narrowly tailored to
achieve that end.
B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and the Probable
Value of Additional Safeguards
The major problem with the use of the Federal Watch Lists is the
uncertainty over their accuracy and probative value. 150 The TSA has stated
that they will not undertake efforts to determine whether individuals are
appropriately identified by the lists, nor will they attempt to validate the
information contained in the lists. 151 An extremely important aspect of the
lists that is frequently overlooked is the fact that the list not only identifies
and stops passengers whose names appear on the list, but they also flag
passengers whose names are similar to those on the lists.'
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This similarity testing is especially troublesome because it
substantially increases the risk of erroneous deprivation of the right to
interstate travel. The risk of erroneous deprivation is especially high for
people with Arabic or Islamic sounding names, as their names require
translations from a language other than English, and the translations
inevitably produce many variations of the same name.
153
15o SEcURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 60, at 6, 31-32.
151 Id. at 31-32.
152 Id. at 56.
153 Looking at just the name Mohamed, one of the most popular in the Islamic world, variations
include: Muhammed, Muhamed, Mohammed, Mohamed, and Mohamud. Other examples Osama,
Osamma, Ossama, Ossamma, Usamma, Ussamma, and Ussama. Specifically my mother's name Lalli
Omar, has been construed as Leila Omar, a substantially different spelling that none the less falls into the
category of "similar" names.
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Under the current system, when a person is identified as being on the
list or having a name similar to the list, there is very little that the person can
do to remedy the situation. Those falsely accused are forced to undergo
additional scrutiny at any and every airport they travel from. If the TSA is
willing to provide adequate procedures to ensure that persons falsely accused
have the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner and have their
names removed from the list, or placed on a "cleared" list that actually
allows them to board flights without additional security, then the likelihood
of continual erroneous deprivations will be greatly diminished.
C. The Government's Interest in Ensuring Suspected
Terrorists Do Not Board Airplanes
The government's national security concerns in screening and
preventing suspected terrorists from boarding airplanes are legitimate.
5 4
There is no debate that the government's mandate to protect its citizens from
another incident like 9/11 is paramount. An essential ingredient of this
protection is screening potential terrorist suspects and threats. This interest
weighs heavily against the passengers' protected liberty and property
interests in air travel.
D. Additional Procedural Safeguards Will Protect
Passengers' Due Process Rights
Even though the government has a compelling interest in ensuring
national security by screening potential terrorist threats, the means chosen to
accomplish this goal are not narrowly tailored to accomplish it. The current
procedures used are over inclusive and deny people falsely accused of any
meaningful redress procedures. In this particular situation, a pre-deprivation
hearing of sorts, occurs prior to a passenger boarding a flight. A TSA agent
makes a determination of whether or not the passenger is allowed to board
the flight. The interest of the government is so compelling that this
procedure is adequate.
It is the method of removing one's name from the list that is
problematic. When a passenger poses no threat to aviation security, i.e.
when they are not in an airport or boarding a plane, the government must
have adequate procedures in place to contest the presence of one's name on
the list. The right to interstate travel is a fundamental liberty that many
people rely on in providing for their livelihood. The complete absence of
meaningful redress procedures for falsely accused persons is appalling.
15 See generally ATSA, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
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Obviously, in the pre-deprivation determination, each individual TSA agent
is able to come to some sort of adjudication; in the case of my mother it has
always been to allow her to fly. This begs the question of why this
determination cannot be made once at the agency level and be used to clear
her each time she flies, instead of repeated independent inquiries by lower
level agents; repeated inquiries which are a waste of already limited airport
security resources.
VII. Compelling the TSA to Adopt Adequate Redress Procedures
The plaintiffs in Green had the right idea in challenging the watch
lists under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Where their
challenge failed was the court in which they chose to file their claim. The
plaintiffs filed in the District Court for the Western District of Washington,
and the court dismissed the bulk of the claims for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.155
Congress has tried to force the TSA to adopt adequate redress
procedures by severely restricting funding to implement any program that
makes use of the watch lists without such procedures.1 56 Unfortunately, the
TSA has not been compelled to take any action in regards to these requests
and continuously claims that adequate redress procedures will be
implemented in the future.
157
As the court in Green made explicitly clear, jurisdiction for
challenges to the merits of final orders issued by the TSA, or the procedures
used in their issuance, is vested solely in the United States Courts of
Appeals.1 58  The Security Directives issued by the TSA to establish and
maintain both the no fly list and the selectee list were issued under the
authority of 49 U.S.C. § 1 14(l)(2), which allows the TSA to issue security
directives without providing notice or the opportunity to comment. 159 The
United States Courts of Appeals are granted exclusive jurisdiction to hear
any challenges to orders issued under this statute. 16°
A Fifth Amendment due process challenge filed in the appropriate
court of appeals (either the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or
155 Green, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
156 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 § 522, Pub. L. No. 108-334,
118 Stat. 1298 (2004).
157 SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 60, at 56-57; 70 Fed. Reg. 36,320 (June 22,
2005).
158 Green, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1123-26.
159 Id. at 1125; see also 49 U.S.C. § 1 14(l)(2) (2005) (giving the Under Secretary authorization to
issue regulations as are necessary to carry out the functions of the Transportation Security
Administration).
160 See 49 U.S.C. §46110(a) (2005) (setting the venue for judicial review of such orders).
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the Court of Appeals for the district in which the plaintiffs reside) is the only
legal remedy available to citizens whose constitutional rights are trampled on
each time they fly. As the Green court did not entertain the merits of the
constitutional challenges to the watch lists, an action filed in the proper court
could be successful thus compelling the agency to finally adopt adequate
grievance procedures.
The adoption of adequate grievance procedures would have dual
benefits, even if court ordered. First, passengers who are falsely identified as
terrorist suspects and face humiliating situations when they fly will finally be
afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Second and of more concern
to the general public, the court ordered redress procedures would go far in
quieting Congressional concerns with the new Secure Flight program, thus
creating a new and hopefully safer system of passenger pre-screening that
would be implemented.
VIII. Conclusion
The horrific events of September 11 have forever changed America's
approach to national security, especially in the area of aviation. In
developing an adequate response, the United States must not forget its
history in responding to national tragedies. Nor can it ignore the
developments and strategies that it has previously undertaken in an effort to
secure its national aviation systems.
The current procedures used by the TSA in screening passengers
who pose a potential threat to our aviation security have not substantially
changed since 1998, three years prior to 9/11.161 The system currently in
place is wholly inadequate, as it is over inclusive, with high likelihood of
false positives, and completely lacking in meaningful redress. This problem
has grown since 9/11, as the Watch Lists supplied by the government have
grown tremendously in the wake of the attacks.
The TSA's first attempt at developing a new system to adequately
deal with passenger screening, CAPPS II, was an enormous failure, as critics
were appalled by its complete lack of concern for passengers' constitutional
rights. The successor to CAPPS II, Secure Flight, seems to be headed down
the same road. Again, the TSA has not heeded congressional warnings to
ensure that falsely accused passengers are afforded procedural due process
protections. Almost half a decade past 9/11, America still does not have an
adequate pre-screening procedure in place that uses expanded watch lists
161 Various heightened airport security measures have changed since 9/11, but the method for
screening "suspected" terrorists has not changed.
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maintained by the government rather than redacted versions in the hands of
airline personnel.
The TSA must develop and implement adequate redress procedures
for passengers who are falsely accused of being suspected terrorists.
Without this safeguard, the due process implications of using the Watch Lists
overshadow the government's interest in preventing terrorism. The
argument is not that the government must allow terrorists to board planes,
but that when an individual is falsely identified as possibly posing a threat to
aviation security, or, even worse, sharing a similar name with someone who
is a threat, the government must allow for adequate procedures to ensure that
these individuals constitutional rights are not substantially burdened each
time they fly. The adoption of adequate redress procedures is a win-win
situation for all involved, as it could lead to the adoption of Secure Flight.
As the TSA has not heeded congressional warnings, it is time for the rule of
law to take effect and to compel the agency to adopt adequate grievance
procedures that give passengers the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
manner.
